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# ***Security Transition***

## **Opportunities for Reductions and Off Ramps**


### **FEEDBACK**

(CORPS COMMENTS IN RED)

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SECTXN-CF RED/OR 2/11/2005      *Sharaka wa Tafahum – Partnership and Understanding*      ~~SECRET//REL MCFI//XT~~

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## 2005 Security Transition Strategy

### Strategy

- Build Iraqi Army capacity to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations
- Progressively transition counterinsurgency responsibility to capable ISF — Conditions-based
- Adjust Coalition force posture and reduce presence
- Continue ISF development
- Improve Iraqi Government capacity to conduct counterinsurgency operations (No Assessment Yet on Governmental Capacity)
- Transform nature of coalition


### Priorities

- Operational Infrastructure (Basing, BSUs) & Sustainment
- Intelligence
- Police
- Borders
- Army Brigade and Division Headquarters
- Command and Control capability
- MOD/MOI Institutional Capacity
- Integrated Iraqi counterinsurgency planning and execution
- Force Protection
- Continuous Force Transition

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## Opportunities

- Near term opportunities (late spring, early summer)
  - Coalition reductions
    - 1.4b
    - US reductions unlikely, would not impact MiTT augmentation
- Mid to far term opportunities (mid summer to fall)
  - Generally promising
    - Continued reductions in need for sustained Coalition presence (*Recommend stating: Continued need for transforming nature of Coalition presence from Expeditionary to Stability and Support or Reductions as available*)
    - Opportunity to form IAG from division designated for OIF 05-07
    - Off ramp between 2-7 more brigades. (*Recommend stating: Transition 2-4 Brigades or equivalents for use in other prioritized tasks list:*)
      1. *Support ISF Sustainment Operations / LOC Security*
      2. *QRF,*
      3. *Election Support,*
      4. *Reconstruction,*
      5. *Additional Transition Teams and Training Assistance,*
      6. *Infrastructure Security,*
      7. *Redeploy*

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## Assumptions and Criteria

Assumptions	Requirements	Criteria
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ISF will require some Coalition logistics support through 2005</li> <li>MNF-I can improve Iraqi military capabilities more rapidly in 2005</li> <li>Iraqi Army can provide/enable the framework for ISF wide operations (No estimated date for operational Army HQ with Title X or C<sup>2</sup> capability)</li> <li>Iraqi Army progress in C2 and framework operations will exceed that of the Iraqi police in 2005</li> <li>Iraqi Army brigade competence will require about 6 months of development after formation (Conditions driven, not time. Progress will not be uniform across between Brigades and Divisions. Critical path based on Logistics Infrastructure)</li> <li>In less challenged areas, Coalition forces can reduce before Iraqi Army brigades fully demonstrate competence. There are NO Coalition (US) formations in these areas above Company level</li> <li>In challenged areas, Coalition forces remain in place until Iraqi Army brigades fully demonstrate competence for several months</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Logistics Function &amp; Infrastructure, and Staff planning capability</li> <li>Capable ISF units and headquarters</li> <li>Competent intelligence systems</li> <li>Police forces, and institutions capable of maintaining domestic Order.</li> <li>Reliable border and infrastructure security forces</li> <li>Special striking forces</li> <li>Iraqi leadership and organizations able to conduct independent counter-insurgency operations</li> <li>National Iraqi organizations that can deploy, manage and support Iraq-wide security operations</li> <li>Wartime mentality &amp; service ethos</li> <li>MOI &amp; MOD institutional capabilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Battalions – Manned and Equipped</li> <li>Brigade Headquarters – Manned and Equipped</li> <li>Brigade Capability – formation plus 6 months of development (Formed at what manning level? If 90%, what is acceptable turn over rate?)</li> <li>Force levels and Security Situation</li> <li>High threat areas historic troop to population ratio 20/1000 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Al Anbar, Ninewah, N Babil</li> </ul> </li> <li>Lower threat areas <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>15/1000 for Salah ad Din (Salah ad Din has greater attack rate than Al Anbar. Salah ad Din has highest per capita atk rate provinces. Currently should fall into same category as other top three)</li> <li>12/1000 for At Tamin, Baghdad (has highest number of attacks per day of all provinces, if N. Babil added to atk numbers then the per capita atks is in top three)</li> <li>10/1000 for all others</li> </ul> </li> <li>Regional Control—local/provincial military, police and civil coordination</li> <li>National Control—local to national coordination, national government and ministerial C2 and direction</li> </ul>

SEE MNC-I ESTIMATES FOR CONDITIONS REQUIRED WITHIN EACH PHASE (slides 38 - 45)

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## Assumptions

- Dahuk, Irbil, and As Sulaymaniayah will not be augmented by CF
- Maysan will only be augmented by British and this is unlikely
- Muthanna will be augmented by Australian Battalion, when 4b, 1.4d contingent withdraws
- Irbil will not receive additional CF augmentation after 4b, 1.4d commitment ends.
- The IPS in Ninewah will take at least 8 months to regain a proper policing capability
- The IPS in Al Anbar will take at least 12 months to regain a proper policing capability
- The IPS will not collapse completely in any other province but has potential to collapse in cities that lack Coalition or Iraqi Army support.
- The 1.4b, 1.4d not be reformed once the 800 withdraw
- The 1.4b, 1.4d will not be replaced by any other CF except for potential in Al Suwaira region
- The UK and 1.4b, 1.4d may draw down but will remain in theatre in the same AOs until at least Dec 05
- At least six months lead time for national level coordination would be required to allow UK or 1.4b, 1.4d to be used out of MND-SE AO. Out of sector use would only be possible in other permissive environments.
- DBE will remain at least constant
- FPS will continue to increase in number but not necessarily in capability

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
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
## Assumptions


- Iraqi Transitional Government will remain committed to MNF-I presence and the UNSCR 1546 process
- Insurgency will continue at roughly the present level throughout 2005 in Sunni areas; security situation across the country will not be uniform
- Properly resourced, trained, and supported, Iraqi Security Forces will be capable of conducting successful counterinsurgency operations
- Iraqi Security Force development will progress as programmed; performance will improve with the **Transition Team** concept **but not in a uniform manner**
- Integrated civil-military action **and logistics sustainment** will be required longer than coalition combat formations. **CMO and logistic forces will continue to require Force Protection. Off ramp is predicated on force protection requirements**
- Coalition partners will support new concepts and force posture adjustments, but within their current areas of responsibility. **Greater opportunities will be available to new coalition partners as battlespace is transitioned to Iraqi Regional and national control.**
- External support to insurgents will continue, but at reduced levels as Iraqi border forces become more capable

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MNF SLIDE: OUR CONCERN IS TO MITIGATE RISK DURING PERIOD OF GREATEST VULNERABILITY

ROLES DURING EACH PHASE BASED ON CAPABILITY AND DESIRED EFFECT FOR ISF T OFIGHT INDEPENDENT COIN OPERATIONS

- DECISIVE / SHAPING (PH I & II)
- SUPPORTING / SUPPORTED (BOTH CAPABLE OF DECISIVE OPERATIONS)
- FINAL ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP IN MUTUAL SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTERESTS

DEALING WITH THE WINDOW OF VULNERABILITY


HOW TO MITIGATE MITIGATE RISK: EVENT DRIVEN, **INTEL DEPENDENT** (Iraqi face)

IF YOU DO EVERYTHING AT ONCE YOU DO NOTHING WELL AND FAIL.  
CAREFUL BALANCE

## TROOP TO TASK ANALYSIS

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BLUF: THIS SLIDE ILLUSTRATES CAPABILITY OVER TIME: ISF INCREASING, COALITION OFF RAMP

ACROSS THE TOP ARE THE WINDOWS WHERE WE WILL ACHIEVE PROVINCIAL CONTROL OF CATEGORY A – B –AND C PROVINCES.

ACROSS THE BOTTOM ARE KEY POLITICAL EVENTS THAT COULD SHAPE OUR DECISION CYCLE.

3 IIF BRIGADES AND THE 6 REGULAR ARMY BRIGADES THAT ARE SCHEDULED TO COME ON LINE BY MID JUN 2005. (DOES NOT SHOW MECH DIV – \$850M FUNDING REQUIREMENT)

AND APPROX 20 BRIGADES IN THE ING ARE ALSO SCHEDULED TO COME ON LINE BY JUN. THOUGH THEIR PRIMARY MISSION IS PROVINCIALY DEPENDENT AND FOCUSED AT SUPPORTING THE LOCAL IPS. (CONSTABULATORY)

THE AGGREGATE OF IPS FORCES IS REFLECTED ON THE TOP. THIS LINE INCLUDES ALL TYPES OF MOI POLICE FORCES (DBE, FPS, SPF, ETC).

AS THESE FORCES INCREASE OVER TIME IT ALLOWS OUR COALITION FORCES TO BEGIN THEIR REDUCTION OVER TIME.

THE COALITION FORCES ARE INDICATED BY THE BLUE LINE. MNC-I WILL RAMP UP TO A TOTAL OF 25 COALITION BRIGADES BY THE ELECTIONS IN JANUARY.

THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMMEDIATELY BEGIN TO TURN OVER SEVEN PROVINCES (CAT A) BY JUN 2005 AND GAIN CREDIBILITY BY DOING SO.



THIS IS WHEN 9 RA BRIGADES WILL BE AVAILABLE TO CONDUCT COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS. (RFF PROCESS THROUGH MOD). THE ING CONSTABULARY ROLE CAN BEGIN TO CREATE A MORE SECURE ENVIRONMENT LOCALLY.

INITIAL DROP DUE TO WITHDRAWAL OF APPROX 2-3 BRIGADES FROM THE [1.4b, 1.4d]  
[1.4b, 1.4d] SECTORS, AND POTENTIALLY THE [1.4b, 1.4d] BEGINNING NOW THRU MARCH.


STARTING IN JUNE CAN FINALIZE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MAT INITIATIVE AND BEGIN TO CONDUCT A SERIES OF OPERATIONS AIMED AT DESTROYING INSURGENTS AND SETTING THE CONDITIONS TO ALLOW TRANSITION OF CATEGORY B PROVINCES (7 PROVINCES).


THIS WILL OCCUR FROM JUNE TO THE JAN 2006.

THE TRANSITION OF 7 PROVINCES FREES UP FIVE BRIGADES TO EMPLOYMENT IN OTHER AREAS.

BUILD: THIS LAST LINE INDICATES THE CURRENT JCS SOURCING GUIDANCE. AS YOU CAN SEE IT IS A MUCH LESS AGGRESSIVE VIEW CONCERNING REDUCTION OF FORCES.

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
## *Evaluating Unit Capability*

- Charts do not account for capability only projected numbers (personnel or Bdes).
- IOT accurately depict real capability the graphs must reflect a validation model based on assessment of a units Mission Essential Task List (METL) performance by Iraqi and Coalition force Commanders.
- Validation Model Variables include:
  - LOGISTICS CAPABILITY
  - METL ASSESSMENT
  - USR TYPE ASSESSMENT

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ISF VALIDATION MODEL: FOLLOWING MAT INTEGRATION AND PARTNERSHIP OPERATIONS

MNSCT-I LIMITED ROLE

GRADUAL INTEGRATION THROUGH PARTNERSHIP MECHANISM

SERIES OF GATES TO BE FULLY INDEPENDENT

GRADUAL INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (Coalition lead, ISF supported, ISF supported)


TIED TO TRAINING CENTER REQUIREMENT

MNC COMMANDERS HAVE A LARGE ROLE

BY HAVING METHOD WE CAN THEN ASSESS RISK AND ADDRESS

APPROPRIATE MITIGATION

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## ***DIVISION METL***

- COMMAND AND CONTROL FORCES WITHIN REGION
- PLAN AND COORDINATE FORCE EMPLOYMENT
- PLAN, COORDINATE & EXECUTE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
- INTEGRATE OPERATIONS WITH ARMY, POLICE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS, AND OTHER IRAQI SECURITY FORCES, AND COALITION FORCES (REGIONAL JOC)
- TRAIN THE FORCE
- CONOPS
- OPERATES IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH COUNTERPART REGIONAL JOC
- OPERATES FROM FIXED BASE. DEPLOYS A FORWARD CP WHEN REQUIRED

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## BRIGADE METL

- CONDUCT TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES
- CONDUCT TACTICAL MOVEMENTS
- CONDUCT STABILITY OPERATIONS
- CONDUCT CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS
- COMMAND AND CONTROL
  - C2 ONE OR MORE BATTALIONS
  - CONDUCT MDMP (TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES)
  - CONDUCT PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY
  - CONDUCT PAY FUNCTIONS
  - EXECUTE RETENTION
  - PROCESS INTELLIGENCE
  - DEVELOP AND EXECUTE TRAINING PLANS
  - SUSTAIN THE FORCE
  - MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS

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## BATTALION METL

- CONDUCT TACTICAL DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES
- CONDUCT TACTICAL MOVEMENT
- CONDUCT STABILITY OPERATIONS (07-1-1270)
- CONDUCT CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS (07-1-4000)
- CONDUCT COMMAND AND CONTROL
- C2 ONE OR MORE COMPANIES (07-1-5027)
- CONDUCT MDMP (TLP)
- CONDUCT RECRUITING, PAY, PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS (07-1-4009)
- PROCESS INTELLIGENCE (07-1-2000)
- DEVELOP & EXECUTE TRAINING PLANS (07-1-5099)
- SUSTAIN THE FORCE
  - TRACK AND COORDINATE LOGISTICS/EQUIPMENT SUPPORT (07-1-4018)
- MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS (07-1-5018)

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
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
**BSU Status**


PRIORITIZED RSU / BSE	STATUS	OPERATIONAL DATE
<b>Al Kisik</b>	<b>Renovation Necessary</b>	TBD
<b>Habaniyah</b>	<b>Renovation Necessary</b>	TBD
<b>Baghdad</b>	Satisfactory Facilities	TBD
BIAP	Satisfactory Facilities	TBD
Kirkuk	<b>Renovation Necessary</b>	TBD
KMTB	<b>Renovation Necessary</b>	TBD
Babil	<b>Renovation Necessary</b>	TBD
Numaniyah	<b>Renovation Necessary</b>	TBD
Basrah	Satisfactory Facilities	TBD
<b>Talil (COB)</b>	Satisfactory Facilities	TBD


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













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## IRAQI SECURITY FORCES MNB-NW/NE















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MNC-I REGIONAL CONTROL - SECURITY CONDITIONS

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- ISF is capable of sustaining independent operations at BCT level
  - Logistics and sustainment capable of supporting BCT operations at direct and organizational levels
- Basing established for all units at Bde level
- Staff functioning at BCT level
  - S1 through S6 Staffs established
- ISF leads COIN operations
  - Sanctuaries for AIF reduced
- ISF provides constabulary role ISO Police to ensure regional domestic order is maintained
  - Intimidation campaign marginalized
  - FPS/Oil protection services capable of providing minimal effects, ensuring minimal services
- Initial capability to conduct regional Intel operations

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MNC-I GOVERNANCE CONDITIONS

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- UNSCR 1546 process is on track
  - ISF capable of safeguarding election process
  - Iraqi participation is maintained
- Functioning local and regional detention and release system ensures domestic order is maintained
- Local and regional governments assuming responsibilities
- Local and regional government administration able to survive party/leadership transitions
- CF assessment that local/regional governments are capable of providing basic services

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MNC-I ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

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- Opportunities exist for economic development
  - Essential services continue to expand
  - Domestic order maintained
  - Economic benefits of production/distribution are realized
- CF assessment that economic infrastructure is capable of providing basic economic services

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MNC-I COMMUNICATIONS CONDITIONS

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- Iraqi people perceive basic services and needs being met by local and provincial government
- Iraqi people perceive ISF are providing regional security
  - Increased confidence and trust in ISF
- Legitimate government of Iraq is perceived as present and functioning although it may not yet be completely effective
- Iraqi people acknowledge that local, and regional governments exist
- CF understands Iraqi needs and perceptions and assess if they are being met

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MNC-I NATIONAL CONTROL - SECURITY CONDITIONS

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- Area BSU(s) and Regional BSU(s) developed sufficiently to support independent Division Operations
- MOD/MOI assume responsibility for ISF sustainment, C2, and Administrative and Logistics support to Joint Forces
- ISF conducts COIN operations and national defense
  - Sanctuaries for AIF eliminated
  - CF supplies fires effects as required
- ISF capability exceeds AIF with ITG freedom of action increased without reliance upon CF for direct support (*in extremis*)
- Rule of Law established with MOI/MOJ/COJ in lead
- ISF provides constabulary role ISO IPS to ensure National domestic order
- Fully capable to conduct national Intel operations

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MNC-I GOVERNANCE CONDITIONS

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- Essential bureaucratic structure and procedures capable of handling national down to local administration in place
  - Functioning relationship between local through national agencies
- Ministries manage and coordinate essential services and basic needs
- CF assess that national government is capable of achieving desired effect

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MNC-I ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

- ITG linkage to local/regional infrastructure development
- Begin establishment of national financial system
- Progression continues for economic development
  - Essential services continue to expand
  - Domestic order maintained
  - Economic benefits of production/distribution are realized
  - Alternatives are sought out to resolve problem areas
- CF assessment that economic infrastructure is capable of providing basic economic services

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MNC-I COMMUNICATIONS CONDITIONS


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
- Iraqi people perceive basic services and needs being met by local, provincial, and national government
- National government is perceived as responsive to local emergencies
- Iraqi people perceive ISF providing national security and independently conducting COIN operations
  - Increased confidence and trust in ISF
- Legitimate government of Iraq is perceived as present and functioning and it's effectiveness is improving
- Iraqi people acknowledge local, regional, and national governments exist
- CF understand Iraqi needs and perceptions and assess they are being met

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
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
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





















SECRET//REL.MOF		OIF 04-06	E-LAD	OIF 05-07	AS OF 28 0800Z JAN 05	
       	MND-NW	1/25 SBCT BOG 05 OCT 05	24 AUG 05	172 SBCT	MND-NW	
		116 BCT BOG 01 DEC 06	17 OCT 05	3 UA/ 101 AA	MND-NC	
	MND-NC	278 BCT BOG 28 NOV 05	11 OCT 05	1 UA/ 101 AA		20 JAN 06
		1 UA/ 3 ID BOG 15 JAN 06	01 DEC 05	1 BCT/ 1 AD		
		3 UA/ 3 ID BOG 22 JAN 06	07 DEC 05	3 UA/ 4 ID		
		2 BCT/ 2 ID BOG 15 AUG 05	2 JUL 05	2/28 ID PENNSYLVANIA		
		8 RCT BOG 16 FEB 05	15 FEB 05	7 RCT		
	MNF-W	2 RCT BOG 01 MAR 05	15 MAR 05	5 RCT	MNF-W	
		155 BCT BOG 15 JAN 06	29 NOV 05	1 UA/ 4 ID		TBD
		2 BCT/10 MTN BOG 5 JUL 05	23 MAY 05	48 BCT GEORGIA		
	MND BAGHDAD	256 BCT BOG 7 OCT 05	21 AUG 05	1 UA/10 MTN	MND BAGHDAD	
		2 UA/ 3 ID BOG 27 JAN 06	12 DEC 05	4 UA/ 101 AA		10 JAN 06
		3 BCT/ 1 AD BOG 07 FEB 05	18 DEC 05	4 UA/ 4 ID		
		4 UA/ 3 ID BOG 08 FEB 05	21 DEC 05	2 UA/ 4 ID		
	OP RES	3 ACR BOG 15 MAR 06	28 JAN 06	2 BCT/ 1 AD	OP RES	
	SECFOR	29 BCT BOG 15 FEB 06	21 DEC 05	1 BCT/1 ID	SECFOR	
	THEATER SECURITY BDE	56 BDE /36ID BOG 3 FEB 06	23 NOV 05	2 UA/ 101 AA	THEATER SECURITY BDE	




No change in the disposition of Iraqi Army and IIF units.

**FOR BACKGROUND INFO ONLY:**

- **Current Status of Force Generation:** This is the current disposition of Iraqi Army and Iraqi Intervention Forces undergoing formation and training in accordance with the CMATT force generation plan.
- 1<sup>st</sup> IIF Bde (-) (in green) remains at Tadjil until completion of MOUT for its last Bn. Remainder of Bde moves to BAGHDAD IAW current deployment plan o/a 15 August.
- 3<sup>rd</sup> Bde (in blue) has completed basic training for 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> Bns. 7<sup>th</sup> Bn is scheduled to complete basic training 2 August. Operational employment planning is underway for the Brigade.
- All other Brigades (in Gray) are in the process of forming for training. They are all undergoing cadre integration (i.e. leader training). The first unit to receive troops for basic training will be 4<sup>th</sup> Bde in Al Kasik (week of 18 July to receive troops). Followed by 2<sup>d</sup> Bde in An Numaniyah around 1 August.
- Facilities and life support remain on track to execute the current force generation plan.







No change in the disposition of Iraqi Army and IIF units.

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- **Current Status of Force Generation:** This is the current disposition of Iraqi Army and Iraqi Intervention Forces undergoing formation and training in accordance with the CMATT force generation plan.
- 1<sup>st</sup> IIF Bde (-) (in green) remains at Tadjil until completion of MOUT for its last Bn. Remainder of Bde moves to BAGHDAD IAW current deployment plan o/a 15 August.
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




















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### Regional Iraqi Control to Iraqi Self-Reliance

Regional Iraqi Control (Mid 2005)		National Iraqi Control (Early 2006)		Iraqi Self-Reliance (Mid-Late 2006)	
ISF / ITG	Coalition	ISF / IG	Coalition	ISF / IG	Coalition
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Maintain local &amp; provincial domestic order</li> <li>■ Assert territorial control through framework ops</li> <li>■ Conduct independent COIN operations with CF support only as needed</li> <li>■ Plan, direct, conduct, and sustain brigade/ provincial level security operations</li> <li>■ Local/provincial police, military, and civil authorities cooperate &amp; coordinate actions</li> <li>■ ISF freedom of action exceeds that of AIF</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Continue to conduct unilateral and joint COIN operations</li> <li>■ Enable independent ISF COIN operations</li> <li>■ Postured to deliver regional supporting effects to ISF</li> <li>■ Prepared to defeat external threats</li> <li>■ Partnership and assistance teams train and advise ISF</li> <li>■ Separate Coalition C2 structure</li> <li>■ Handover provincial security responsibility to ISF</li> <li>■ Small reductions in force posture; reduce presence in cities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Maintain national domestic order</li> <li>■ Enforce rule of law</li> <li>■ Conduct independent COIN operations</li> <li>■ Preserve Iraq's territorial integrity and deter external threats with CF support in <i>extremis</i></li> <li>■ Plan, direct, conduct, and sustain division/ national level security operations</li> <li>■ National, provincial, &amp; local governments effectively linked</li> <li>■ Ministries direct, support, and sustain assigned ISF</li> <li>■ ISF no longer depend on CF to deal with insurgency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Assist Iraqi COIN operations</li> <li>■ Postured to deliver supporting effects to ISF when requested</li> <li>■ Assistance teams train and advise ISF</li> <li>■ Combined Coalition &amp; Iraqi C2 structure</li> <li>■ Progressively transition national security responsibility to ISF</li> <li>■ Significant reductions in force posture</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Maintain national domestic order</li> <li>■ Conduct Independent national COIN operations</li> <li>■ Maintain national security without CF assistance</li> <li>■ Plan, direct, conduct, and sustain independent national security operations</li> <li>■ National C2 structure</li> <li>■ Capable, legitimate &amp; representative IG</li> <li>■ Civil and economic infrastructures meet basic needs of Iraqis</li> <li>■ Insurgent / terrorist threat neutralized</li> <li>■ Partner in GWOT</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Assume strategic overwatch</li> <li>■ Handover national security responsibility to ISF &amp; IG</li> <li>■ Assistance teams train and advise ISF</li> <li>■ Rotational training with ISF</li> <li>■ Cooperative security arrangements with ISF &amp; IG</li> <li>■ Minimal to no combat forces in-country</li> </ul>

**Under Development**

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## ***MNF-I Enabling Effects for Regional Iraqi Control***

- ISF capable of brigade/provincial level operations
    - All units capable of independent operations
  - ISF controls territory across province through framework operations
    - Includes: intelligence collection, security presence, defense of bases/stations, and limited offensive action
  - ISF capable of conducting independent COIN operations, with CF support as needed
    - Ability to concentrate and coordinate forces for intelligence-led offensive operations (cordon & search and kill/capture)
  - CF capable of providing regional supporting effects to ISF and defeating external threats
    - Includes: kinetic/non-kinetic fires, logistics, transport, QRF, intelligence, communications, and liaison
  - Local & provincial domestic order maintained
    - IPS conducting operations within local constraints
- Assistance teams and partnership with ISF will facilitate achieving effects

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## ***MNF-I Enabling Effects for National Iraqi Control***

- ISF capable of division/national level operations (as appropriate)
- ISF capable of conducting independent COIN operations
  - Includes framework and offensive operations
- ISF capable of deterring external threats and preserving territorial integrity of Iraq, with CF support *in extremis*
  - Includes border security/policing
- CF capable of providing regional supporting effects to ISF when requested
  - Includes: kinetic/non-kinetic fires, intelligence, and liaison
- National domestic order maintained
- Rule of law established and enforced
- ISF no longer depend on CF to deal with the insurgency

Assistance teams and partnership with ISF will facilitate achieving effects

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## ***MNF-I Regional Iraqi Control Definition***

Regional Iraqi Control, judged on a province by province basis, is defined as the conditions whereby local and provincial Iraqi security forces are sufficiently organized, trained, and equipped to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain security operations at the brigade/provincial level. Command and control structures are functioning, and Iraqi police, military, and civil authorities cooperate and coordinate their actions at the local/provincial level. Additionally, the capabilities of ISF are increased to a level where Iraqi freedom of action exceeds that of anti-Iraqi forces.

Under Regional Iraqi Control, ISF can maintain domestic order in a counterinsurgency environment, assert territorial control through framework operations, and conduct independent counterinsurgency operations with Coalition support only as needed. Coalition forces reduce unilateral operations, increase joint operations, are postured to deliver regional supporting effects to Iraqi security organizations, and are prepared to defeat external threats and preserve Iraq's territorial integrity.

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### ***MNF- I Required Tasks – Necessary Conditions for Regional Iraqi Control***

- Organize, train, and equip local & provincial ISF
- ISF plan, direct, conduct, and sustain brigade/provincial level security operations (as appropriate)
  - Requires 6 months of partnership and assistance team support to deliver full brigade-level capability
- Develop local and provincial C2 structure (JCCs and PJCC)
- Local & provincial Iraqi police, military, and civil authorities cooperate and coordinate their actions
  - Formal supported-supporting relationships unlikely to exist
  - Solutions likely to vary by province based on pragmatic development of working relationships
- Increase ISF capabilities to level where Iraqi freedom of action exceeds that of AIF
- ~~Combined ISF capability sufficient for operating area and threat level~~

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## ***MNF-I National Iraqi Control Definition***

National Iraqi Control is defined as the conditions whereby Iraqi security forces are organized, trained, and equipped to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain division/national level security operations. Iraq's national, provincial, and local government organizations are effectively linked, with ministries that can deploy and support integrated and complementary security operations throughout the country. A combined Coalition-Iraqi command and control structure is in place to plan and execute national level counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, the capabilities of ISF have increased to a level where they no longer depend on CF to deal with the insurgency.

Under National Iraqi Control, ISF maintain domestic order, enforce the rule of law, conduct independent counterinsurgency operations, preserve Iraq's territorial integrity, and deter threats to the national security of Iraq with Coalition support *in extremis*. Coalition forces assist Iraqi operations as needed, remain postured to deliver supporting effects to the ISF when requested, and progressively transition national security responsibilities to the Iraqis.

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### ***MNF-I Required Tasks – Necessary Conditions for National Iraqi Control***

- Organize, train, and equip national ISF
  - Development of an Officer Corps within each service of the ISF
- ISF plan, direct, conduct, and sustain division/national level security operations (as appropriate)
  - With minimal CF direct support (logistics, transportation, comms etc.)
- National, provincial, and local government organizations effectively linked
- MOD/MOI direct, support, and sustain assigned ISF throughout Iraq
  - Formal national supported-supporting relationships unlikely to exist
- Develop combined Coalition & Iraqi C2 structure
  - National level counterinsurgency planning and execution capability
  - Able to coordinate MOD, MOI, and Coalition force operations
- ISF and INIS collect, share, and exploit intelligence
- ~~Security ministries supported by essential functions (judiciary, prisons, etc.)~~

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